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Article 1

FOREWORD

A Duty-Oriented Procedure in a Rights-Oriented Society
John B. Attanasio*
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever possible.., as a peace-maker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity to be a good man. There will still be business enough.
- Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a law lecture, July 1, 18501
I.
On September 16, 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went
into effect. The event marked the culmination of a long process. A distinguished advisory committee of law professors and practitioners
drafted the rules. The Supreme Court then approved the rules, and
Congress allowed them to go into effect when it did not exercise its reserved statutory authority to veto them. Since that time the rules have
2
been revised a number of times by subsequent advisory committees.
In 1988, Notre Dame Law School and the Notre Dame Law Review
sponsored a symposium celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of these
rules. We were privileged to host the current chairperson of the rules
advisory committee, the current reporter, and two former reporters.
With these and a number of other luminaries, this gathering and its published results offer not only an opportunity to celebrate the accomplishments that the rules embody, but also an occasion to ponder where to go
from here.
A number of profound challenges beset our current procedural system. We live in a rights-based society, in which the number and types of
substantive legal claims 3 that we can impose on each other have proliferated. 4 Our rights-based ethos that powerfully influences current legal
thought has catalyzed many of these issues. Impelling liberals and conservatives alike, this rights-based milieu presents our procedural architecture with at least two very different kinds of dilemmas. One very
practical difficulty involves the sheer number of cases that rights-based
thinking helps to inspire. A second problem, which might be described
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; LL.M., Yale Law School; Dipl. in Law, Oxford
University; J.D., New York University School of Law; B.A. University of Virginia. I wish to thank
Professor Robert Rodes and Kathleen Spartana for their helpful suggestions. I also wish to thank
Michael Slinger and David Boeck together with research assistants Eugene Assaf, Christopher Shaw,
and Bruce Hicks.
I THE LIFE AND WRITING OF ABRAnAm LINCOLN 329 (P. Stem ed. 1940).
2 See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1004-05 (1987).
3

The word "claims" is borrowed from Hohfeld. See W. HOHFELD, SOME FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL

CONCEPTIONs 37-38 (1923).
4 See, e.g., R. DWORXIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
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as attitudinal, concerns how the rights-based approach to substantive law
can impair the integrity of an independent system of procedural justice.
This brief foreword simply identifies some problems that rightsbased thinking poses for procedural justice. First, the essay explores the
practical, empirical concerns stemming from bulging court dockets and
the additional problems spawned by the institutional responses to those
dockets. Second, the analysis examines the more subtle and perhaps
more worrisome attitudinal changes effected by the rights-based society.
Third, the essay attempts to indicate how some of the papers in this symposium have endeavored to engage the challenges posed by the rightsbased society. 5
II.

The empirical concerns mentioned above are often referred to as the
"litigation explosion." 6 Beyond requiring federal procedure to treat
more cases, the litigation explosion has forced cases of tremendously variable size and substance on one set of ostensibly trans-substantive rules.
Theoretically, the same Federal Rules must handle everything from the
comparatively small debt case to mammoth mass disaster cases like Agent
Orange.7

Simple economics would have predicted some increases in litigation
over the past few years. Many of the factors driving this phenomenon
represent important advances in our search for justice. First, in its 1977
decision of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,8 the Supreme Court allowed lawyers to advertise with the concomitant potential to expand their markets. 9 Second, legislation increasingly provides for awarding attorney's
5

I am not criticizing the expansion of substantive rights. See infa text accompanying notes 7-

18.
6 For example, from 1970 to 1986, the number of civil cases filed in federal court increased
from 82,665 to 254,249, or 297%. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. MELTZER, & D. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 51 (3d. ed. 1988). See also R. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-129 (1985); Burger, Symposium: Reducing the Costs of
Civil Litigation: Introduction, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217 (1985); Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives
on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643 (1985).
Controversy surrounds even the claim of a litigation explosion itself, as some commentators
dispute the extent to which this assertion is true as a descriptive matter. See e.g., Galanter, The Day
After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What
We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983); Saks, If There Be a Crisis,
How Shall We Know It?, 46 MD. L. REv. 63 (1986);
Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: Examining the CriticalAssumptions, 37
RUTGERS L. REv. 319 (1985).
7 See generally P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986).
8 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
9 Since Bates, the Court and the bar have continued to expand the rights of lawyers to advertise.
See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988); Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England
and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 508-10 (1984).
In response to some who have downplayed the impact of advertising on market behavior, John
Kenneth Galbraith has remarked, "[tihe present disposition of conventional economic theory to
write off annual outlays of many billions of dollars of advertising and similar sales costs by the planning system as without purpose or consequence is, to say the least, peculiar." J. GALBRAITH, THE
NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 188 (4th ed. 1985).
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fees, which now fund a significant amount of litigation.1 0 Third, between
1970 and 1985, the ratio of lawyers to overall population increased dramatically, from 1/572 to 1/360.1" All of these lawyers must be occupying
themselves somehow.
Additionally, and perhaps more fundamentally, the rights-informed
ethos has caused federal dockets to grow. Good and appropriate commitments to equal access and to new substantive claims are prominent
examples of our rights-driven concept ofjustice. Myriad developments,
including some that I have already described, have afforded avenues of
recourse to many in our society who have lacked access to our system of
justice. 12 According to one noted ABA study, this lack of entry has affected not only the poor, but also the middle class.' 3 Fueling part of any
so-called litigation explosion, then, has been a drive for equal access to
the rights that substantive law already guarantees.
Part of the phenomenon almost certainly has resulted from adjudicating newly promulgated or enforced substantive claims. Legislatures
have proffered some of these initiatives, 14 courts have fashioned others,' 5
and both institutions have shared in formulating still others.' 6 Inevitably, the dual commitments to equal access and new substantive rights
would fuel some increase in litigation. The rights-oriented mindset has
even recast the way we think about courts. Many now think of courts not
solely as resolvers of individual disputes, but as major forces for social
change in our society.' 7 This broader role requires a more sophisticated
procedural response.'
These developments and the perceived burdens on the judicial process that they have imposed have provoked a wide variety of reactionssome of which have further strained the process of civil dispute resolution. Congress has dramatically increased the size of the federal judici10 See, e.g., Berger, Cou'rtAwardedAttorney's Fees: What is Reasonable?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 303
n.104 (1978); Leubsdorf, Toward a History ofthe American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoas. 9 (1984).
11 B. CURRAN, K. RosICH, C. CARSON & M. PUCCETTr, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 1985 1 (1986) [hereinafter B. CURRAN, SUPPLEMENT]; B.
CURRAN, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN
THE 1980s, 4 (1985) [hereinafter B. CURAN, REPORT]; The number of lawyers has also increased
dramatically; between 1970 and 1985, it went from 355,242 to 655,191. B. CURRAN, SUPPLEMENT,
supra, at 1; B. CURRAN, REPORT, supra, at 4.
12 See Attanasio, supra note 9, at 519-21.
13 Id.
14 An example of legislative initiative is the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
15 Strict liability in products cases is an example ofjudicial initiative. See, e.g., Prosser, The Fallof
the Citadel(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE LJ. 1099 (1960).
16 The civil rights area illustrates combined legislative and judicial efforts. See, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
17 See Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigationand the Burger Court, 96
HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281
(1976); Fiss, The Social and PoliticalFoundations ofAdjudication, 6 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 121 (1982);
Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword. The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1979).
18 For other potential causes of the litigation explosion, see McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 818, 821 (1988).
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ary, but this solution may have distinct limits. 19 Another less conscious,
but economically predictable result has been that fewer cases go to trial.
Indeed, as few as 5% of all federal lawsuits proceed to trial and pretrial
20
motions resolve approximately 35% of all federal litigation.
Other predictable reactions have emerged. To ease the burden on
the federal courts, some would scale back their
jurisdiction and their ex21
pansive interpretation of substantive rights.
The advocates of alternative dispute resolution are pressing a strong
challenge to the litigation model.2 2 The attractiveness of this competing
paradigm stems partly from lower costs as compared with the traditional
litigation model. Some of these costs are financial, 23 but there are others
as well. For example, judicial process can be time-consuming. Moreover, litigation in general and trial in particular can exact high emotional
costs. 2 4 Sometimes, ill feelings can make healing and reconciliation
25
difficult.
In some sense, alternative dispute resolution might be understood
as part of a larger movement to privatize adjudication. In many areas,
the Supreme Court has allowed arbitrators and private courts to resolve
even important public law disputes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has construed the Federal Arbitration Act to require lower federal courts to ab26
stain from hearing cases in which an arbitration agreement exists.
Moving beyond our traditional conception of arbitration, new businesses
2 7 Of
are sprouting that offer private judges and court-like facilities.
course, privatization of law is hardly a new development; the phenome19 R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 14, 36 (size ofjudiciary can adversely affect ability to attract candidates and manageability of decision-making at the appellate level).
20 Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatoiy Procedurein Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494, 511-12 (1986).
The number of cases going to trial has declined dramatically in recent years. Id. at 558.
21 See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 175-315. Cf Judicial Improvements and Access to justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, - Stat. - (1988) (reducing the reach of diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts).
22 See generally Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U.
CHi. L. REv. 424 (1986); Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L.
REV. 1 (1985).
Calling this "alternative dispute resolution" may offend aficionados of this model. Many of
them think about this approach as simply being dispute resolution, with judicial process serving as
one alternative.
23 See Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. RV. 219, 248-51 (1985).
24 G. CALABRESI & P. BoBarrr, TRAGiC CHOICES 55, 58-59, 61 (1978); see also L. HAND, LEcTuRas
ON LEGAL Topics 105 (1926) ("After now some dozen years of experience I must say that as a litigant
I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.").
25 See McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE LJ. 1660 (1985). Of course, sometimes
disputants may want a cathartic process, and the litigation model supplies this opportunity. Other
difficulties might also inhere. For example, at least one commentator worries that alternative dispute resolution may disserve the disadvantaged in institutional litigation. See Fiss, Out of Eden, 94
YALE LJ. 1669 (1985); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984). Cf Edwards, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1986) (warning of additional dangers
and complaining of a lack of adequate information with which to form opinions).
26 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Sherman Act and other public laws).
27 Raven, PrivateJudging: A Challenge to Public Service, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1988, at 8; Thompson,
Lucrative 'Rent-a-Judge' Firms Court Legal Scholar Criticism, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Mar. 20,
1988, at IA, col. 2.
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non has deep roots in our history. 2s Still, of late, legislative proposals
have surfaced which would impose public law obligations-as against
voluntary, contractual ones-to enlist private adjudicators prior to, or instead of, courts. For example, prominent products liability proposals
also have given defendants substantial incentives to admit liability and
submit any disagreement about damages to an arbitrator.2 9 Although
they are not strictly private, administrative alternatives have also
emerged such as the recent proposal of the American Medical Association to resolve medical malpractice disputes.3 0
Perhaps the widespread perception of crowded dockets, the strain of
new types of cases, and the competition from various alternatives have
prompted responses from the federal courts themselves. The litigation
model has changed so much that trial remains not so much the exception
as a veritable freak.3 ' Hand in hand with this continuing move away from
the trial version of the litigation model is the emergence of what has
been called "managerial judging."3 2 Those who describe this approach
depict judges as being intimately involved in the litigation process,
closely supervising cases from the pleadings through discovery and eventual resolution-generally by settlement.
The move towards managerial judging has interesting parallels with
the alternative dispute resolution movement. As Robert McKay suggests
in his article in this symposium, federal judges have invoked the broad
mandates of Rule 16 to incorporate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms into federal proceedings. 3 3 Increasingly, they have also involved
many non-judges in the process.3 4 Often, small cases are tried before
magistrates; and in the mammoth Agent Orange case, the district court
made extensive use of special masters.3 5 Thus, to cope with the burdens
of a heavy docket, the method of resolving disputes under the Federal
Rules is changing. Ultimately, the challenge posed involves the feasibility of applying these uniform rules of procedure to3 6the number and variety of cases presented by the rights-based society.
28 M. HoRwrI-z, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 145-59 (1977).
29 Dodd, A Proposalfor Making ProductLiability Fair,Efficient and Predictable, 14 J. LEGIS. 133, 14142, 146-47 (1987). Cf Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Stat. -

(1988) (experimental arbitration program in the federal courts for amounts in controversy of

less than $100,000).
30 See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIVILJUSTICE SYSTEM
FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILrrY DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (1988).

31 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
32 See Resnik, ManagerialJudges,96 HARv. L. REv. 376 (1982).
33 See McKay, supra note 18.
34 C. SERRON, THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES (1985); Brazil, Special Masters in
Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciaty or ReshapingAdjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 394 (1986).
35 See P. SCHUCK, supra note 7, at 5, 82-83, 144-47.
36 See, e.g., Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage ofAdjudicative Services and the Needfor a
Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HAR,. L.REv. 1808 (1986); Burbank, OfRules and Discretion: The
Supreme Court, FederalRules and Common Law, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 693 (1988); Cover, ForJames
Wrn. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE LJ.718 (1975).
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III.
Such factors as the proliferation of substantive rights, the equal access to those rights, and the heavy reliance on courts as agents for broadranging societal reforms have burdened the Federal Rules in fairly obvious ways. As I have already suggested, the rights-based milieu exerts a
more subtle kind of stress on our procedural architecture: it influences
thinking about procedural law. While one can marshal powerful arguments in favor of a rights-based approach to substantive law,3 7 it is a
category mistake to focus solely on perceived substantive rights when
dealing with issues of procedural jurisprudence.
Procedural justice in large measure must exist independent of,
rather than subservient to, substantive justice. Otherwise, two unfortunate results can ensue. First, we might deprive litigants of procedural
rights that help to protect their dignity as persons. For example, while
we might seek the truth to reach the correct substantive result, we are
unwilling to subject a deponent to physical violence to obtain it. Second,
clouding procedural duties with rights-based thinking can distort or impair principles of substantive law. Rights-oriented lawyers and clients
who strongly believe in the substantive merits of their cause may be willing to distort and obfuscate so as to undermine the existing mandate of
substantive law.
Renowned moral philosopherJohn Rawls describes the ideal type of
38
pure procedural justice that exists apart from actual substantive results.
Rawls uses the rather unexpected illustration of gambling. If those risking their money agree on a fair system of rules, they will abide by the
eventual distribution of winnings and losses even if the distribution disproportionately favors certain individuals over others. For Rawls, the
obligation to obey these procedural rules
obtains independently of the
39
actual distributive shares they generate.
Of course, the question of whether there is a coherent boundary line
between procedural and substantive justice has plagued procedure scholars for quite some time.40 Without getting embroiled in this debate, let
me just make two brief points. First, the very attention devoted to this
issue may derive in part from some basic intuition that procedural justice
has an integrity independent of substantive rules. Second, while a universal boundary line between matters of substance and matters of procedure may be difficult to draw, each of these admittedly elastic concepts
conveys to the legal community some core of shared meaning that can be
37 See generally text accompanying notes 11-13, supra. With respect to substantive law, I take
rights-based thinking as a descriptive given for purposes of this essay. For a discussion of the interaction between concepts of rights and duties in substantive law, see Attanasio, The Principleof.Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677, 723-34, 749-50
(1988). For an interesting discussion of rights and duties in moral reasoning, see O'Neill, Children's
Rights, Children's Lives, 98 ETHics 445 (1988).
38 SeeJ. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 84-85 (1971).
39 See id at 86-90.
40 See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth ofErie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693 (1974);
Kane, The Golden Wedding Year: Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
671 (1988).
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used to resolve a substantial number of issues. 4 1 Obviously, the drafters
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure fastened on this distinction besome shared understanding
tween substance and procedure 4 2 to identify
43
of what constitutes a procedural rule.
Assuming that some ascertainable realm of procedural justice does
exist, what conditions ought it entail? While exhaustive accounts are difficult, Rule 1 contains a widely accepted list of basic demands. In this
version, the goal of procedural justice is to ascertain the facts fairly, accurately, and efficiently and apply the substantive law to them. To accomplish this mission and retain its integrity, procedural justice must be
conceptualized differently from substantive justice. If courts should enforce rather than undercut substantive rights, strong concepts of duty
must inform a system of procedural justice, even if strong concepts of
rights inform substantive law. Litigants must honor-or overtly pursue
existing procedures to change-duly promulgated societal conceptions
of substantive rights. Substantive rights cannot be determined through
procedural maneuvers calculated to subvert their operation, but instead
should be fashioned through an open, accepted process in which judges,
juries, legislators, and other relevant decision makers participate.
Rather than a duty-premised course, however, a largely rights-based
ethic has dominated the American approach to procedure. Such a course
intensifies our already strong commitment to a highly adversarial system.
Within the fairly lax parameters allowed by the rules, the litigants are
free to press their cause with all available vigor. Somehow the clash of
positions will produce a result that comports with contemporary notions
of substantive justice, despite the best procedural efforts of litigants to
the contrary.
Ironically, or perhaps predictably, efforts to control the adversarial
dialectic between opposing litigants have only spawned another dialectic
between litigants as a group and rules advisory committees. Advisory
committees have modified the Federal Rules to curb the more egregious
litigation tactics which one side might deploy. In response, many attorneys transform these new measures into additional or different weapons.
Thus, they subvert these intended controls to gain new advantages in the
litigation joust that will necessitate still other countermeasures. And so
the rules dialectic proceeds ....
Let us take a familiar example. Since the initial conception of permissiveness in pleading and openness in discovery, the drafters have imposed more obligations on the litigants. For example, they have added
Rule 16 which affords broad-ranging powers to impose duties on litigants; they have promulgated additional discovery obligations and sanctions;4 and perhaps most importantly, they have modified Rule 11 to
41

See D. LOUISELL, G. HAZARD & C. TAnr, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE

(5th ed. 1983).
42 See Clark, Two Decades of FederalCivil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435,446 (1958); Clark & Moore,
A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE LJ. 387 (1935).
43 See generally Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
44 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), (g).
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allow a fairly controversial array of sanctions. 4 5 Implementation of such
measures indicates the advisory committee's increasing sensitivity to a
more duty-oriented conception of procedure. The committee's attempted reorientation has attained only limited success, however, as
these changes have taken place within the rights-oriented, adversarial nomos. In a strong rights-premised, adversarial milieu, many attorneys believe that they are ethically entitled and even obligated, within very broad
parameters, to do what is possible to advance the wants and interests of
their clients.
Against this zealous backdrop, modifications of the rules enjoy marginal success. Consistent with the ethical injunctions of the adversarial,
rights-based model, attorneys view new rules like Rule 11 as additional
or different weapons in their litigation arsenal rather than as new duties
to curb abuses. Thus, new abuses may well replace old ones. The rights
perspective sees a rule as a possible exercise of power, an entitlement of
litigation, not as an obligation of justice to act or forego acting.
At bottom, the problems that I have described are moral and human
ones that no set of rules is likely to cure. 4 6 Of late, judges have begun to
perceive these difficulties in human terms. This gradual realization together with the strain of the rights-oriented society may well have
prompted the managerial judging phenomenon. The thought may be
that the malaise of overzealous litigation can only be detected and solved
at a human level, despite the subjectivity entailed by this method. Obviously, this considerable discretion stands in some tension with the ideal
of a uniform set of rules. Indeed, at some level, the informal and flexible
process threatens the entire vision of uniformity which underlies the
Federal Rules. 4 7 Unfortunately, litigants can use even this discretion to
seize tactical advantage.
The participants in the litigation enterprise must change, as many
judges already have, to understand the ethical dimensions of procedural
problems. Specifically, the radical adversarial model must be softened so
that the rules of civil procedure are not perceived merely as entitlements
to be used as means of achieving a particular desired result, but rather as
ethical ends which are good in themselves. In this connection, an important value that strongly influences much jurisprudence today is the Kantian categorical imperative. 48 This ethical duty requires ethical action to
treat others as ends rather than as a mere means. To satisfy the imperative in the litigation context, litigants should not treat opponents as mere
means to the end of victory, but must continue to engage them as ends,
45

See, e.g., FEDERAL PROCEDURE COMMITTEE, LITIGATION SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS (2d. ed. 1988); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, RULE 11 AND
OTHER SANCTIONS (1987); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in
the Struggle Between Compensationand Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313 (1986).
46 See L. Hand, Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, Address by Learned
Hand before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Nov. 17, 1921), reprintedin 2 ASS'N
BAR CITY N.Y. LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 87 (1926).
47 See Resnik, supra note 32; see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of
Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
48 See I. KANT,THE METAPHYSICS OF ETHICS 40 (J. Semple trans. 1869). See also H. PATON, THE
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 129 (1948).
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as fragile human beings. Litigants ought to see rules of procedure as
injunctions to treat others as ends, not as entitlements to use others to
pursue their own claims. Litigants should perceive procedural justice as
having intrinsic, and not merely instrumental, value.
My point is fairly basic: there are some actions we believe we ought
not take against other people even to achieve a substantively just result.
For example, if someone unjustly breaches a contract, I cannot simply
rob that person to obtain recompense. To put the point more starkly, if
someone kills my spouse, shooting that person is not a permissible procedure to obtain substantive justice-even in a society that recognizes
the death penalty. Indeed, methods used to pursue the goal of truth,
which is so fundamental to our conception of substantive and procedural
justice, are limited by the dignity of all persons, including opponents. In
this connection, we do not permit discovery by dragging the opponent
behind a horse for a mile or two.
Plaintiffs should not reduce defendants to sacks of money. On the
other hand, defendants should not reduce physically or monetarily injured plaintiffs to potential debits on balance sheets. Real flesh and
blood people exist on either side of a lawsuit possessing real substantive
rights that the law bestows. In the most vulnerable interlude that is litigation, lawyers should not try to prey on natural weaknesses by trying to
triumph at any cost. Departures from this Kantian ideal impair not only
instrumentally valuable means to a substantively just result but also intrinsically valuable procedural norms. If civil procedure is conceptualized as a system of dispute resolution, then this should perform a healing
function. People remain people throughout litigation and must not be
49
reduced to mere pawns in some elaborate game.
Treating procedural duties as ethically independent ends in themselves may sound attractive, but let us posit the truly hard case. In an oftcited essay, Robert Cover posed several actual fact patterns that involve
manipulation of procedure to avoid the evil of allowing someone else to
be enslaved. Does avoiding this malignant result legitimate procedural
sleight-of-hand? Cover made a convincing argument that procedural
manipulation is indeed justified to avert this substantive horror.5 0 The
case of legalized slavery posits a cogent circumstance for what resembles
a kind of civil disobedience of a corrupt substantive order. Perhaps, we
do not so much forsake procedural duties at that point as much as reject
the validity of such an obvious and outrageous substantive injustice.
Under the extreme circumstances posited, moral trumps of a higher
order may well require that substance-neutral procedural principles be
forsaken. Nevertheless, one.must narrowly circumscribe the conditions
under which one would relinquish the aspiration for neutral procedural
49 With some regret, I do not deny that litigation has some aspects of a game.
50 See Cover, supra note 36. Aquinas argues that when a law enslaves a person, it is unjust, and
consequently, ceases to be law. See T. AquiNAs, SUMmA THEOLOGICA, I,II, Q.95, art. 2 ("I answer
that, as Augustine says, that which is not just seems to be no law at all.... But if in any point it
deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.").
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principles. 5 1 Lawyers are guardians of process. 5 2 The charge is in some
sense sacred because process helps to shield us from that decision by
whim often called tyranny.
IV.
Many of the papers presented in this symposium implicitly engage
the struggle for procedural justice to come to grips with the rights-oriented society. In his article, Arthur Von Mehren provides a conceptual
point of departure for us to contemplate the procedural ends of fairness
and efficiency articulated in Rule 1. Specifically, he builds on his earlier
seminal work with Benjamin Kaplan comparing the German procedural
model of periodic trials with the American model of prolonged pretrial
and continuous trial.5 3 The context of comparative law helps us examine
such values as fairness and efficiency by placing them against the back54
drop of concrete legal systems.
Two papers etch the contours and precepts of our current procedural system. Geoffrey Hazard nicely encapsulates the model that the
Federal Rules have followed of striving to adjudicate one factual transaction completely in a single trial. This is the familiar trans-substantive
paradigm of resolving all legal causes of action arising from the same
factual transaction in a single proceeding and under one set of procedural rules. Hazard also recounts the inherent limitations of this transsubstantive ideal. Edward Cooper astutely surveys how the appellate
stage of the current adjudicatory model can affect trial. Focusing on
Rule 52(a), he presents a valuable picture of standards of review on
appeal.
While the preceding papers concern our current approach to procedural justice, several others challenge the viability of that system. Mary
Kay Kane's article tests the entire premise of a cognizable boundary between substantive and procedural rules. Kane describes the dogged
problems which continue to trouble the federal courts on this score. Stephen Burbank critiques the trans-substantive vision of procedural justice
that the Federal Rules profess to embody. Using the context of statutes
of limitation, Burbank depicts quite vividly the elusive quality of attempts
to fashion such rules.
Moving to a different set of concerns, Joseph Bauer examines the
Supreme Court's vision of an independent system of procedural justice.
Specifically, Bauer questions the weight that the Supreme Court currently affords advisory committee notes in interpreting the rules. He
51 Kant's ethical system has been criticized for its "rigorism" in denying one the right to lie in
the face of an unmitigated evil. However, at least one author argues that parts of the Kantian system
will sometimes permit lying under such circumstances. Moreover, although parts of Kant's writings
do reject such behavior, this result "does not impugn Kant's ethic as an ideal system. Instead, it
shows that we need special principles for dealing with an unmitigated evil." See Korsgaard, The Right
to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325, 327 (1986) (arguing that morality itself
sometimes allows or even requires something that from an ideal perspective may be wrong).
52 See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT 102-04 (1980).
53 See Kaplan, Von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71 HARv. L.
REv. 1193, 1443 (1958).
54 Tur, The Dialectic of GeneralJurisprudenceand ComparativeLaw, 1977 JURID. REv. 238.
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asks why the Court which is explicitly vested with the power to draft the
rules should defer in subsequent interpretations to the committee that
only advises it.
A final group of papers cluster around the theme of procedural reform. Of necessity, some engage the dialectical approach that currently
dominates procedural change; however, some also argue for more fundamental revisions. Paul Carrington, current reporter of the advisory committee, sets out a number of intriguing proposals for modifying Rule 4.
Most notably, he discusses dropping the territorial jurisdiction requirement in federal question cases to permit nation-wide service of process.55
Judge McLaughlin recounts the problems in discovering the opinions of opposing experts. The secrecy often shrouding such information
contrasts sharply with the openness that characterizes discovery and
looms particularly important in light of the battles of experts that define
so many trials. To ameliorate this incongruity in the rules, Judge McLaughlin recommends greater availability of information regarding
experts.
Jack Friedenthal discusses several recent Supreme Court decisions
which afford greater opportunities for summary judgment. While these
rulings may expedite the litigation process, they also offer new litigation
weapons, of which defendants in particular might avail themselves. Also
addressing problems emanating from the rules dialectic, Judge Kenneth
Ripple and Gary Saalman examine the important and complex development of Rule 11 jurisprudence. They carefully delineate some difficulties
in applying this Rule to constitutional adjudication.
Two articles relate new ways of thinking that may enable us to break
the rules dialectic. The circle of rule abuse and modification represents a
kind of long run expression of our extreme adversarial mindset. Robert
McKay describes a different way of thinking which places primary value
not on winning, but on more cooperative methods of solving disputes.
As McKay skillfully demonstrates, this model has exerted such powerful
sway that many federal courts are introducing some of its methods into
federal litigation. Unfortunately, however, even the methods of alternative dispute resolution can be transformed into litigation weapons.
Judge John Grady, the chairperson of the rules advisory committee,
pleads that the hearts and minds of the participants in this great spectacle
change. Judge Grady lays blame on lawyers, law professors, and judges
alike, calling for each group to modify its behavior.
With specific regard to law professors, we must begin to think about
duty-premised notions of procedure, whereby lawyers feel internally constrained rather than simply externally forbidden from engaging in certain
behavior. I am not sure how to reach this goal. The starting points with
which some have grappled include introducing legal ethics and alternative dispute resolution into the first-year procedure course. Perhaps we
should devote more classroom time to examining what lawyers should or
55 Federal venue requirements would still remain. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982).
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should not do, as against what they can or cannot do.5 6 Discussion of
philosophical notions such as the Kantian categorical imperative or the
Rawlsian theory of pure procedural justice may prove useful. Possibly,
we should relate stories about the bad things that the extreme litigation
model can do to people. Maybe, we should recount the perspectives of
forebears like Abraham Lincoln or Learned Hand.
I recognize that these are sketchy and inadequate solutions, but new
ways of thinking about procedure will take time for those of us who were
socialized into the old system. While the notion of an essential respect
for others is fairly simple, detailing its ethical and other implications
would undoubtedly prove quite complex. I have obviously left many of
these points to be worked out at some other time. Even if we can develop and "profess" a duty-based system of procedure, this would hardly
solve all the problems debated in this symposium. For example, it would
not make Erie go away. This essay, however, only aspires to provide a
provocative beginning-a "foreword."
On a personal note, I would like to thank the distinguished participants who presented papers, moderated sessions, or otherwise contributed to this conference. I only hope the printed page begins to convey
the sense of intellectual excitement they brought to this gathering.

56 See, e.g., T. SHAFFER, FArrT AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987); Bums, A Lawyer's Truth. Notes for a
Moral Philosophy of Litigation Practice, 3 J. L. & RELIGION 229 (1985); Cramton, Beyond the Ordinary
Religion, 37J. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1987); Fried, The Lauyeras Friend" The Moral Foundationsofthe LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) and Correspondence, 86 YALE LJ. 573 (1977); Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and ProfessionalEthics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29.

